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Abstract:
We quantitatively analyze the way inflation alters the inequality of the income distribution in
the U.S. economy. The main mechanism emphasized in this paper is the “bracket creep” effect
according to which inflation pushes income into higher tax brackets. Governments adjust the
nominal income tax brackets slowly and incompletely due to the rise in prices. In the U.S.
postwar history, this typically happens less often than once every other tax year. We develop
a general equilibrium monetary model with income heterogeneity. In line with our time series
evidence, it is rather the frequency of income tax schedule adjustments than the overall level
of inflation that has a perceptible impact on the distribution of income. We find that a longer
duration between two successive adjustments of the tax schedule reduces employment, savings,
and output.
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1 Introduction
The“bracket creep”defines a shift of personal income into a higher tax bracket when taxable
income grows over time. It occurs due to inflation. Higher inflation possibly increases tax
burdens under a progressive personal income tax as taxpayers near the top-end of a tax
bracket are more likely to “creep” to a higher bracket. Clearly, this effect alters inequality
in after-tax income. Whether it increases or decreases inequality depends, among others,
on the level and duration of inflation, the top income tax rate, and the intitial distribution
of income. The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of the “bracket creep,” or
rather its attenuation through inflation indexation of the tax schedule, on the distribution
of income both empirically and in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model
for the U.S. economy.
Like in the U.S. most personal income tax systems are progressive, i.e. structured with
marginal tax rates exceeding average rates and increasing with the base. Taxpayers who
receive only nominal increases in wages to offset higher inflation tend to be pushed into
higher brackets. This effect is considered to be particularly severe (“the cruelest tax”) in
times of high inflation as was seen during the last half of the 1970s when U.S. inflation rates
averaged 8.9 percent annually (Blinder and Esaki, 1978). To combat bracket creep in the
U.S. the Reagan Administration implemented an indexation of the personal exemptions
and the tax brackets based on a cost-of-living index derived from the Consumer Price Index
for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U). These provisions were actually enacted in 1981 as part
of Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA), but delayed in their implementation and did not
become effective until 1985; see Altig and Carlstrom (1991, 1993), Auerbach and Feenberg
(2000).
In inflationary environments, with unchanged or loosely adjusted rate schedules and brack-
ets, tax collections tend to rise. This raises the claim that bracket creep is strategically
used by some governments to maintain tax revenues. A loose or strategically implemented
“pure one-year-lag” index system can be shown to cause taxable income to be overstated by
the current rate of inflation (Altig and Carlstrom, 1991, 1993). Apart from its (mis-)use
as revenue instrument, the omisson of inflation adjustment of marginal tax rates is also
very likely to have a considerable effect on the distribution of income.
Figure 1 shows the annual time series of inflation and the Gini coefficient of market income
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Figure 1: Inflation rate and Gini coefficient, 1948-2004
(before taxes) for the period from 1948 to 2004. It highlights the relationship between the
two series. Both series are coined by an upward trend up to the 1980s. While this trend
continues for the Gini, the inflation rate calms down and follows a slight downward trend
as of the early 1980s. Overall, the two series seem to comove –sometimes more, sometimes
less in phase– at business cycle frequencies. A close inspection reveals that the series get
more entrained after the mid-1980s, suggesting that indexation following ERTA has led to
a more contemporaneous relationship.
These observations are in line with the empirical part of the present study which finds
that inflation has a transitorily inequality reducing impact that leads aggregate measures
by about two years. The central strategy of this part, however, is to take a stand on how
the effective U.S. tax system was affected during the total postwar period and then to
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investigate the consequences of infrequent indexation relative to the sort of system that
has been in place since the mid 1980s. Methodologically, we focus on a bivariate study of
the correlation structure of the inflation rate and Gini coefficient series at business cycle
frequencies in the spirit of Sims (1980).1 Our methods are primarily descriptive and as such
imposing less assumptions than the more structural specifications used in the literature.
Yet we seek to contribute to the literature by assessing whether the progressive bias of
inflation is predominantly driven by the level and persistence of positive inflation or rather
by an infrequent adjustment of the tax schedule. This task requires to go beyond descriptive
time series analysis.
In the theoretical part of the paper, we develop a monetary DSGE model of progressive
income taxation.2 In our simulations, we compare both high inflation environments (1970s)
with moderate inflation environments (rest of postwar U.S. history) and infrequent schedule
adjustment regimes (before ERTA) with less infrequent schedule adjustment regimes (after
ERTA). In response to higher inflation or a longer duration of the bracket creep, individuals
face higher income taxes, both on average and marginally. As a consequence, agents
adjust their labor supply and savings decisions. Our results support the view of Altig and
Carlstrom (1991, 1993). Accordingly, the indexing scheme introduced by ERTA bounded
the problem but issues of inflation and tax-system interactions are far from moot and being
solved.
To summarize our empirical results in Section 2, we find, using correlation analysis, that
the relationship between the Gini coefficient and inflation rate dynamics got both more
contemporaneous and statistically robust after introducing the indexation scheme. The
former is confirmed by studying bivariate spectral measures.
Our results from the general equilibrium model exercise are as follows: The level of in-
flation has a rather small effect on income. In particular, the inflation elasticities of the
1 Recent studies examining the effects of bracket creep on income use either panel data or large scale
macro-models (Saez, 2003; Immervoll, 2005). Romer and Romer (1998) and Galli and van der Hoeven
(2001) analyze inflation as one central explanatory of inequality in cross-sections.
2In a monetary DSGE model with sticky prices and a progressive income tax similar to ours, Heer and
Maussner (2012) show that in the presence of a lagged adjustment of marginal tax rate and pensions higher
unexpected inflation results in a more unequal distribution. However, they only consider an adjustment lag
of one year and do neither study the effect of the adjustment frequency nor the bracket creep in isolation.
In addition, they consider the effects of a temporary increase of inflation rather than a permanent one.
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Gini coefficients of wage and total after tax income amount to 0.01 and 0.15 percent, re-
spectively. However, if we consider a tax policy regime that adjusts the tax schedule for
inflation more frequently, we find that agents increase their labor supply by 6.3 percent
and savings by about 4 percent compared to a system with less frequent adjustments. The
implied Gini coefficient elasticities amount to approximately 0.2 percent. Hence, in this
scenario inflation elasticity increased. This insight can be reconciled with our findings from
the empirical part: A more significant and contemporaneous relationship between the Gini
coefficient and inflation rate dynamics for a more frequent indexation (annual adjustment
since 1985) implies a more immediate and concerted reaction of private households’ be-
havior to inflation. A more infrequent adjustment dilutes this direct reaction due to the
possibility of spreading it. The former results in a higher, the latter in a lower elasticity
as found in our model’s simulations. We conclude that the inflation rate exceeding some
threshold (e.g. 5 or 10 percent) is less problematic for the effects of the bracket creep
compared to the duration of creeping up brackets.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents empirical evidence
for U.S. time series. Section 3 introduces the OLG model with two assets: money and
equity. The model is calibrated with regard to the characteristics of the U.S. economy in
Section 4. Our numerical results are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical analysis
In the first section of the empirical part, we find that inflation indexation introduced in
1985 offsets the redistributional effects of inflation with a lag of approximately 1.5 years,
leading to the more transitory and contemporaneous relationship that we observe since
the mid-1980s (Figure 1). Overall, prior to indexation of the U.S. brackets, the statistical
significance is rather weak. Since 1985 the relationship got both more contemporaneous
and robust in terms of statistical significance. The comovement can also be rationalized
theoretically. First, the after-tax income of the income-poor households, remaining in a
bottom-end bracket, increases other things being equal. Secondly, the incentives to supply
labor increases for the low-productivity households as the after-tax wage rate increases.3
3With the help of U.S. panel data on individual tax returns, Saez (2003) uses the bracket creep as
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In the second section of the empirical part, spectral analysis confirms the finding from the
time domain that the relationship between the Gini coefficient dynamics and the inflation
rate got more contemporaneous since the introduction of the indexation in 1985. Bivariate
spectral density estimates are particularly informative with regard to the lead-lag rela-
tionship of income inequality and inflation as they are computed for a continuous range
of ordinary frequency. We estimate these measures for time series on income inequality
and inflation in the U.S. for a longer sample period than has previously been available. In
particular, we find that the average duration of association between the inflation rate and
the Gini coefficient shrinks from more than three years in the pre-1985 period to less than
two years in the post-1984 period.
2.1 Data
Our annual data on aggregate income inequality is drawn from Gini coefficient series that
were recently made available by Kopczuk et al. (2010). The series date back to the late
1930s. Hence, our period of observation is considerably longer than the one of studies
using data from the Current Population Survey that became available in the 1960s. A fact
that makes this series particularly suited for our purposes is that it is based on individual
rather than family-level data, which is more adequate in the context of income taxation.
The series is available up to the year 2004.
For the inflation rate series, we rely on CPI-U based time series (base year is chained, 1982-
1984 = 100) provided in annual frequency by the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. In
total, our period of observation covers 57 years. It ranges from 1948 to 2004.
2.2 Correlation analysis
Our analysis in the time and frequency domain requires stationary time series. For the
U.S. inflation series it has not yet been conclusively resolved whether it is best treated as
stationary or non-stationary. To survey the voluminous literature on this issue is beyond
the scope of this paper. As Ng and Perron (2001) show, unit root (U.R.) test outcomes
source of tax variation in order to construct instrumental variable estimates of the sensitivity of income to
changes in tax rates. He estimates a labor supply elasticity of taxable income of around 0.4.
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crucially depend on the choice of test. Unreflective reliance on U.R. tests seems hazardous
in the present context. Thus, we adopt another approach in the spirit of Canova (1998). We
compare results with the known potential distortions induced by the detrending filter used
(A’Hearn and Woitek, 2001, p. 327-328), and compare across filters to judge robustness.
For the inflation rate series, we also compare it to findings treating the raw series as
stationary. The filters we consider are the widely used highpass Hodrick-Prescott filter
with a smoothing weight λ for annual series equal to 100 (HP), the log-difference filter
(logD) that would be ideal for a difference stationary process, and the recently proposed
bandpass Baxter-King filter (BK) and Christiano-Fitzgerald filter (CF) both with a cut-
off frequency of 15 years; see Hodrick and Prescott (1997), Baxter and King (1999), and
Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003). Additionally, we use two recent modifications of the
HP and BK filter suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002) and A’Hearn and Woitek (2001),
respectively. The modified HP filter (MHP) sets the smoothing parameter λ = 6.25 for
annual series. The modified BK filter (MBK) takes care of the undesirable sidelobes in the
gain function by so-called Lanczos’s r-factors. Overall and similar to Wälde and Woitek
(2004), we rely on six different filter devices.
Figure 2: Significant correlations between Gini coefficient and inflation rate (1948-2004)
Figure 2 displays significant correlation coefficients between the inflation rate and Gini
coefficient series for the total sample period, that is from 1948 to 2004. Correlation coef-
ficients and corresponding standard errors are obtained by regressing cyclical components
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Figure 3: Significant correlations between Gini and inflation (1948-1984 and 1985-2004)
of inflation rate data on cyclical components of the Gini coefficient series, where series
were normalized to have zero mean and unity variance in advance. Standard errors are
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent following Newey and West (1987). Fig-
ure 2 plots a dot corresponding to the estimated correlation coefficient for inflation rate
leads (Gini coefficient lags) of two years and one year (starting from the left), for contem-
poraneous correlations, and for inflation rate lags (Gini coefficient leads) for one and two
years.4 Only coefficients significant at a 10% or lower level are displayed. They are shown
as distributions for combinations of series filtered by different filtering techniques. As we
take six different filters into account − and in the case of the inflation rate series also the
raw series −, there is a maximum of 7 × 6 = 42 significant correlation coefficients at each
considered lag.
Overall, we estimate in about one fifth of considered possible correlations a significant
coefficient. We find the most significant correlations at the two years lags and leads, re-
spectively. For 30 combinations of differently filtered series, all correlation coefficients at
the two years inflation rate lead (lag) are negative (positive). This suggests a counter-
cyclical, though merely robust (only in 20 percent of considered detrending cases, we find
4As, on average, the U.S. income tax schedule has been subject to minor changes roughly every 1.6
years and to major changes about every second year over our total period of observation (see Appendix
7.1), we focus on first and second lags and leads, respectively.
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significant correlations), relationship at the corresponding frequency. The effect that there
are four positive contemporaneous estimates is a result one should expect: when two time
series of the same length are countercyclical at a lag of two years, they need to be pro-
cyclical if one series is lagged by half the length of a cycle. Note that the finding of five
negative correlations at a lead of one year can be interpreted as an indication for a more
complex cyclical structure shared by the two underlying series. It is also noteworthy that
the mean frequency of bracket adjustment in the postwar U.S. is 2.11 years (Appendix
7.1).
For the pre-1985 period, there is evidence for a significant correlation between inflation
and income inequality in less than five percent of analyzed cases (left schedule of Figure 3).
Both findings for the total and pre-1985 period somehow contrast with the ones of studies
from the 1990s that find current inflation to be of progressive nature in the postwar U.S.
(Bulir and Gulde, 1995 and Jäntti, 1994).5
For the post-1984 period, clearly significant results are found in nearly half of the considered
correlations both for one year and two years lags (right schedule of Figure 3). They are the
ones that are most in favor of an adjustment effect: Although, the U.S. income tax system
has been effectively indexed for inflation as of 1985, a perfect indexation is extremely hard
to realize in practice. The fact that it takes time to assess the exact inflation rate and to
adjust tax-band limits and other nominally defined parameters of the tax code accordingly
can be interpreted as responsible for the significant correlations between inflation and
income inequality at first and second annual lag. It might be also due to a peculiarity
of the cost-of-living index derived from CPI-U that is used to adjust bracket limits and
personal exemption levels under ERTA. In this context Altig and Carlstrom (1991) note
that ERTA defined the cost-of-living index as the average CPI-U for the 12-month period
ending September 30 of the year prior to the tax year, divided by the average CPI-U for
the analogous period. Thus, because tax years and “index years” are by definition not
synchronized, ERTA mandates that inflation adjustments be made with an approximate
lag of one year. The displacement of index inflation rate and actual inflation rate is not
5Jäntti (1994, p. 373) notes that the ERTA of 1981 is among the tax policies that most likely have
affected the U.S. income distribution. To control for these changes in policy his estimates include a dummy
taking on a value of one from 1981 onward. However, given that the tax bracket indexation for inflation
represents the crucial change introduced by the ERTA, a later dated structural break should have been
used as indexing was delayed until 1985.
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exactly one year as the former rate is constructed using the average of the CPI-U over the
12-month period ending 15 months (16 months since 1986) prior to the relevant tax year.
Positive as well as negative correlations at a zero lag can be seen as suggesting a partial
offsetting of a progressive tax effect of inflation induced by schedule adjustment measures.
We carefully interpret these findings from time domain techniques as lending support to
a transitorily inequality reducing impact of inflation that leads aggregate measures of in-
equality by at least one to two periods (tax years). Since 1985 the relationship got both
more contemporaneous and robust in terms of statistical significance.
2.3 Bivariate spectral analysis
An approach that characterizes the dynamics of multiple time series in an intuitive sum-
mary way and that is suited to describe and analyze contained cyclicalities at different
frequencies is spectral analysis. Any n-dimensional stationary process Xt has a spectral
representation at frequencies ω ∈ [−π, π] in the form of a spectral density matrix F (ω) . It
is given by the Fourier transform of the covariance function γjk (τ), τ = 0,±1,±2, ..., for














γn1 (ω) · · · γnn (ω)
 and F (ω) =





fn1 (ω) · · · fnn (ω)
 .
Because F (ω) is an even function, it is sufficient to examine it in the interval [0, π]. The
diagonal elements f11 (ω) , ..., fnn (ω) are the real-valued autospectra or power spectra. The
off-diagonal elements represent cross spectra fjk (ω) = cjk (ω)−iqjk (ω), consisting of cjk (ω)
cospectra and qjk (ω) quadrature spectra.
Implementing (1) is problematic, for it requires autocovariances and covariances from −∞
to +∞. The approach taken here follows A’Hearn and Woitek (2001). It consists in
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estimating bivariate VAR models of order p,6 the lag length being determined by Akaike’s
information criterion, and letting the model parameters determine the covariance function.






A (ω)−∗ . (2)∑
denotes the error variance-covariance matrix. A (ω) is the Fourier transform of the
matrix lag polynomial A (L) = I − A1L − . . . A1Lp, where L is the backshift operator.
The superscript “*” denotes complex conjugate transpose. As noted above, the cross-
spectra are complex valued functions in ω, but simple manipulations yield the more readily
interpretable, real measures: phase shift ps (ω) and squared coherency sc (ω).




sc (ω) = κ2jk (ω) =
|fjk (ω)|2
fjj (ω) fkk (ω)
. (4)
The phase shift (ps) measures the phase lead (ps > 0) or lag (ps < 0) of a series j over the
series k at a certain frequency ω. The respective ps measure is computed at the maximum
of squared coherency sc, i.e. at that frequency ω, where the cyclic components contained
in the two series at stake show the highest degree of linear relationship. The sc measure
takes on values between 0 and 1. Precisely, it indicates the proportion of the variance of
the component of frequency ω of either series that can be explained by its linear regression
on the other series; see Koopmans (1995, p. 142). Both spectral parameters ps and sc can
be calculated and displayed for a range of different frequencies. This gives us the phase
and coherence spectral densities.
Figure 4 illustrates plots of the key bivariate measures coherence and phase over the total
period for a sample detrending device combination case (cf. Section 2.1): It displays the
results for the sample case, where the inflation rate has been filtered using a standard HP
filter, the Gini coefficient using the CF filter, respectively.7 Figure 5 is the corresponding
one for the two considered subperiods. In the following, we briefly interpret the shown
sample cases before generalizing our results for all filters.
6We set the maximum order we allow for to pmax = 3. Our results are not sensitive to this choice.
7Note this assumes all of our considered filters to approximately show the properties of nonegative
definite filters that leave phase relationships contained in the series undisturbed. For our used filters, this
assumption should mostly be justified; see Koopmans (1995, p. 138, pp. 207-208).
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Figure 4: Sample spectra: Gini coefficient and inflation rate (1948-2004)
As can be seen from Figures 4 and 5, the coherence spectra are characterized by two peaks,
corresponding to periodicities contained in the Gini coefficient series (see the coherence
spectrum shapes – both in Figure 4 and the two plots in Figure 5).8 The numbers shown
below the left schedule of Figure 4 give the corresponding frequencies in years (“Peak
Period”), where the linear association between the Gini series and the inflation series reaches
its first and second maximum (“sc”). The same information is given at the bottom of the
first and third diagram displayed in Figure 5. For the 1948-2004 and the 1948-1984 period
there are nearly equally coherent periodicities contained in the two series corresponding
to frequencies of 6 to 7 years and about 3 years, respectively. The squared coherency
depicted on the ordinate is roughly doubled comparing the pre-1985 period with the total
period. For the 1985-2004 period there is only one top coherent periodicity (with sc clearly
different from zero) shared by the two series that shows an sc value of 0.67. It corresponds
to the lower frequency or longer cycle of 6.9 years. For the total and pre-1985 period
one of these cyclic components lags the corresponding cycle contained in the inflation rate
series, the other one shows a contemporaneous coherency (implied |ps| ≤ 1 year) with the
period in the inflation series. This can be seen in the phase spectra plots in Figures 4
8Note frequency denoted on the abscissa is in ordinary units. The corresponding period length is the
inverse of these values. Hence, the highest frequency is 0.5, i.e. the Nyquist frequency, corresponding to a
cycle with a period length of two (= 1/0.5) years.
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Figure 5: Sample spectra: Gini coefficient and inflation rate (1948-1984 and 1985-2004)
and 5.9 The decisive point is that the phase spectrum for frequencies corresponding to
the shared cyclic component of 6-7 years (i.e. the lower frequency, which is the closer to
the origin on the abscissa of all diagrams) shows an approxiamtely linear shape for this
frequency interval with negative slope. This means that the Gini coefficient business cycle
component lags the inflation rate series. For the post-1984 period the slope of the phase
spectrum in the (0.15; 0.20) frequency interval (i.e. about 5 to 7 years cycles) is less steep,
corresponding to a phase shift of -1.36 years as opposed to the -2.63 and -2.83 years in
the total and pre-1985 years period (values shown at the bottom of the second diagram
in Figure 4 and the second and fourth diagram in Figure 5), respectively. In the range of
the higher frequency cycle the corresponding components of the two series fluctuate nearly
in phase for all considered periods. The implied phase shift values range between 0.42
and 0.83 years. Note, for the total and pre-1985 period and for frequencies in-between the
two marked phase constellations the corresponding sc estimates still take on considerable
values. In our sample case illustration it equals about 10-28 percent (total period) and
9Instead of plotting the phase spectrum in the interval [−π, π], we follow the suggestion in Priestly
(1981, p. 709) and plot it in the intervals [−3π, π], [−π, π], and [π, 3π], in order to avoid discontinuities
due to the fact that the phase is only defined mod 2π. Readers not familiar with the interpretation of
bivariate spectral measures are referred to Appendix 7.2 for a brief summary on how to read sample phase
spectra.
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about 40-70 percent (pre-1985 period), respectively. This does not apply to the post-1984
period that is characterized by a single-peaked coherence spectrum.
For all detrending device combinations, the corresponding sc values range from about ten
to more than 90 percent, depending on observation period and filter.10 A summary of the
results is given in Table 1 (left part). It shows that the average absolute phase shift of
a contained periodicity identified at maximum of squared coherency shrank from the pre-
1985 to the post-1984 period by about 35 percent from 2.6 to 1.7 years. The charactersitic
double-peaking property of the coherence spectrum –see, for example, also the second
coherence spectrum in Figure 5, although less prononouced– led us to also construct a
measure of the duration D of association between the inflation rate and Gini coefficient
dynamics, which might be interpreted as the dynamic (intertemporal) bias of bracket creep.
It is defined as phase lead of inflation minus contemporaneous phase or more formally as
follows:






if −1 < ps < 1
ps − (ω̃) = arctan
−qjk(ω̃)
cjk(ω̃)
if ps ≤ −1,
and ω∗, ω̃ denote frequencies at local maximum of squared coherency, respectively. A
summary of implied D-values for our estimates is given in the right part of Table 1.
Table 1: Average phase shift and dynamic bias for different detrending device combinations















* medians in parentheses
Accordingly, the dynamic bias of bracket creep in years nearly halved since 1985. These
findings suggest that the annual inflation indexation of the U.S. tax schedule as introduced
10A detailed table of estimated bivariate spectral measures for all considered combinations of detrending
devices is available on request from the authors.
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in 1985 offsets the redistributional effects of inflation with a lag of approximately one
and half to two years. According to Altig and Carlstrom (1991, 1993), this lag can be
attributed, at least in parts, to an idiosyncratic definition of an “index year” as opposed to
a tax year introduced by the automatic U.S. tax code indexation in the mid-1980s. They
label the U.S. system a “pure one-year-lag index system.”
In combination with our findings from time domain techniques, we interpret the results
from frequency domain techniques as lending support to an inequality reducing impact
of inflation that last longer and represented a continuing effect over several years in the
period before 1985. After the inflation indexation of the U.S. tax schedule became effective
in 1985, there is still an impact from lagged inflation on income inequality; see, for example,
also Altig and Carlstrom (1991, 1993). However, for the post-1984 regime it is clearly of
more transitory nature.
Quantitatively assessing the distributional effects of changes of tax-band limits is a complex
task for it requires to consider adjustment-induced changes in the behavior of the private
sector. These changes can virtually not be controlled for in time series analysis or other
econometric models. A candidate model that is able to account for these changes is an
adequate DSGE model that is set up in the following.
3 Model
In this section, we develop a general equilibrium overlapping generations model with en-
dogenous equity and money distribution. Four sectors can be depicted: households, pro-
duction, the government, and the central bank. Households maximize discounted life-time
utility. Agents can save either with money or with capital. Individuals are heteroge-
neous with regard to their productivity and cannot insure against idiosyncratic income
risk. Firms maximize profits. Output is produced with the help of labor and capital. The
government provides unfunded public pensions which are financed by a progressive tax on
wage and capital income. The money growth rate is set by the central bank and seignorage
is collected by the government.
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3.1 Households
Every year, a generation of equal measure is born. A subscript j of a variable denotes the
age of the generation. The total measure of all households is normalized to one.
Households live a maximum of T + TR years. Lifetime is stochastic and agents face a
probability sj of surviving up to age j conditional on surviving up to age j − 1. During
their first T years, agents supply labor l elastically. After T years, retirement is mandatory.












where β, cij, and m
i
j denote the discount factor, consumption and real money balances of
agent i at age j, respectively. Instantaneous utility u(c,m, 1− l) is given by:
u(c,m, 1− l) = ln c+ (1− γ) lnm+B ln(1− l). (6)
Workers are heterogeneous with regard to their labor earnings per working hour. The
worker’s labor productivity e(z, j) is stochastic and depends on his age j and an idiosyn-
cratic labor productivity shock z. We assume that the idiosyncratic part of productivity
follows a first order finite state Markov chain with conditional transition probabilities given
by:
π(z′|z) = Pr{zt+1 = z′|zt = z}, (7)
where z, z′ ∈ E . Although the dynamics of productivity may be modeled slightly better
by a second order Markov chain (Shorrocks, 1976) the improvement in accuracy is rather
small and does not justify the considerable increase in the model’s complexity.
Furthermore, agents are born without wealth, a1 = 0, and cannot borrow, aj ≥ 0 for all j.
Wealth a is composed of real money m and capital k. Capital or, equally, equity k earns a
real interest rate r. We further assume a short-sale constraint k ≥ 0. Parents do not leave
altruistic bequests to their children. All accidental bequests are confiscated by the state.
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Agent i receives income from capital ki and labor li. The budget constraint of the working


















where wt and πt =
Pt−Pt−1
Pt−1
denote the wage rate per efficiency unit labor and the infla-
tion rate in period t, respectively. Pt is the price level in period t. Individual nominal
income Pty
i
jt ≡ Ptwte(z, j)lijt +Ptrtkijt is taxed at the progressive rate τ .11 In addition, the
households receive transfers trt from the government.
During retirement, agents receive public pensions pent in period t irrespective of their
employment history and the budget constraint of the retired agent at age j = T+1, . . . , T+
















The necessary conditions of the working households with regard to consumption cijt, capital
kij+1,t+1, real money m
i
j+1,t+1, and labor l
i






































where ux(.) denotes the first partial derivative of the utility function with regard to the
argument x = c, 1 − l,m. The first-order conditions of the retired household are given by
(10)-(12) with lijt ≡ 0.
11In models similar to ours (but without a monetary sector), Ventura (1999) and Castañeda et al. (2003)
study the effects of a flat rate tax reform on distribution and welfare. We follow Castañeda et al. who
assume that both labor and interest income are taxed at the same rate.
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3.2 Production
Firms are of measure one and produce output with effective labor N and capital K. Ef-
fective labor Nt is the product of working hours and individual productivity and is defined
in more detail below.
Effective labor Nt is paid the wage wt. Capital Kt is hired at rate rt and depreciates at
rate δ. Production Yt is characterized by constant returns to scale and assumed to be
Cobb-Douglas:





In a factor market equilibrium, factors are rewarded with their marginal product:





t − δ. (16)
3.3 Government
Government expenditures consists of government consumption Gt, government lump-sum
transfers Trt to households, and social securities expenditures Pent. Government expen-
ditures are financed by an income tax Taxt, seignorage St, and confiscated accidental
bequests Beqt:
Gt + Pent + Trt = Taxt + St +Beqt. (17)
We follow Castanñeda et al. (2003) and characterize the U.S. income tax structure by a
progressive tax function. In particular, we also adapt the following functional form for the










We further assume that the government adjusts the nominal income tax brackets every
TB year. Without the loss of generality, we assume that the income tax rate schedule is
adjusted in periods (=years) t ∈ {0, TB, 2TB, 3TB, . . .}. With regard to our tax function
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(18), this is equivalent to assume that the tax parameters {b0,t, b1,t, b2,t} are adjusted every
TB years so that the real tax burden is the same as in the benchmark year t = 0. As a
consequence, agents average and marginal income tax rates increase in the years between















In the stationary equilibrium, all goods and factor markets are in equilibrium, the govern-
ment adjusts the tax schedule every TB years, the government budget is balanced, money
growth at the exogenous rate θ, and individual and aggregate behavior are consistent. A
full description of the stationary equilibrium together with the computational methods is
provided in the Technical Appendix that is available from the authors upon request.
4 Calibration
Periods correspond to years. We assume that agents are born at real lifetime age 20 which
corresponds to j = 1. Agents work T = 40 years corresponding to a real lifetime age of
60. They live a maximum life of 60 years (TR = 20) so that agents do not become older
than real lifetime age 80. The sequence of conditional survival probabilities {sj}59j=1 is set
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equal to the Social Security Administration’s survival probabilities for men aged 20-78 for
the year 1994.12 The survival probabilities decrease with age, and s60 is set equal to zero.
The calibration of the parameters α, δ, pen, and θ and the Markov process e(z, j) is chosen
in accordance with existing general equilibrium studies. Following Prescott (1986), the
capital income share α is set equal to 0.36. The annual rate of depreciation is set equal to
δ = 0.08. Pensions are distributed lump-sum to the retired agents. The replacement ratio
of pensions to net average earnings amounts to 50% in every period t. Hence, pensions are
a function of the distribution µt and, hence, Kt and Nt, and are the same every TB periods.
The income tax rate is adjusted every TB = 3 years in accordance with the average of
adjustment frequencies in the pre-85 period and the total U.S. postwar history: This can
be seen by calculating the average of means reported in the fifth line from bottom and the
last line in Table 6 (Appendix).13 The model parameters are summarized in Table 2.
The tax function (18) is calibrated with the help of the estimates from Gouveia and Strauss
(1994).14 In particular, we set the income tax parameters in period t = 0 (where we
normalized the price level to one, P0 = 1) equal to b0 = 0.258, b1 = 0.768, b2 = 0.031.
The income tax parameters b0 and b1 are taken from Gouveira and Strauss for the tax year
1989, while b2 has been adjusted so that the tax rate of the average income in our model
is equal to the tax rate of the average U.S. income. Every TB years, these parameters
are adjusted so that the average and marginal tax rates of the real income are unchanged
between period TB and p · TB, p = 1, 2, . . ..
The labor endowment process is given by e(z, j) = ezj+ȳj , where ȳj is the mean lognormal
income of the j-year old. The mean efficiency index ȳj of the j-year-old worker is taken
from Hansen (1993), and interpolated to in-between years. As a consequence, the model
is able to replicate the cross-section age distribution of earnings of the U.S. economy.
Following İmrohoroğlu et al. (1998), we normalize the average efficiency index to one. The
age-productivity profile is hump-shaped and earnings peak at age 50.
The idiosyncratic productivity shock zj follows a Markov process. The Markov process is
12We thank Mark Huggett and Gustavo Ventura for providing us with the data.
13Our qualitative results are the same in the cases TB = 2 and TB = 4. The results for the case TB = 4
are also presented in section 5.
14These parameter values have also been applied by Castañeda et al. (2003).
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Table 2: Calibration of parameter values for the U.S. economy
Description Function Parameter
utility function U = γ ln c+ (1− γ) lnm+B ln(1− l) γ = 0.974, B = 1.72
discount factor β β = 0.969
production function Y = KαN1−α α = 0.36
depreciation δ δ = 0.08
money growth rate θ θ = 0.05
pension replacement rate 0.50
periods between
tax schedule adjustments TB TB = 3








b0 = 0.258, b1 = 0.768,
in t = 0 with P0 = 1 b2 = 0.031
labor endowment process zt = ρzt−1 + εt, εt ∼ N(0, σε) ρ = 0.96, σε = 0.045
ln e(z, 1) ∼ N(ȳ1, σy1) σy1 = 0.38
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given by:
zj = ρzj−1 + εj, (21)
where εj ∼ N(0, σε). Huggett (1996) uses ρ = 0.96 and σε = 0.045. Furthermore, we
follow Huggett and choose a lognormal distribution of earnings for the 20-year old with
σy1 = 0.38 and mean y1. As the log endowment of the initial generation of agents is
normally distributed, the log efficiency of subsequent agents will continue to be normally
distributed. This is a useful property of the earnings process, which has often be described
as log normally in the literature.
The remaining three parameters β, B, and γ from the utility function are chosen to match
the following characteristics of the U.S. economy as closely as possible: i) the capital-output
ratio K/Y amounts to 3.0 as found by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1995), ii) the average labor
supply of the working households amounts to approximately one third of available time,
and iii) the average velocity of money PY/M is equal to the annual velocity of M1 during
1960-2001, which is equal to 5.18. Our calibration β = 0.969, B = 1.72, and γ = 0.974
implies a capital-output ratio equal to 2.98, an average labor supply l̄ = 0.326, and an
annual velocity of money equal to 5.12.
5 Results
In this section, we study the effects of a change of the money growth rate θ or, equally, the
inflation rate π on the stationary distribution of income. Remember that, in our benchmark
case, the inflation rate is equal to 5% (in the U.S. the average CPI-U for the 1970s, 1980s,
and 1990s equals 5.2%), and the tax schedule is adjusted every 3 years. The effect of the
“bracket creep” on the average tax rates is illustrated in Figure 6 (where the average real
income of the economy is normalized to one). The average income tax and the marginal
tax rate hardly change after one or two years of bracket creep. Hence, we would expect
only small effects from the bracket creep on the individual’s savings and labor supply.
Table 3 summarizes our results for the benchmark case. The first column gives the number
of periods that have been elapsed since the last tax schedule adjustment. The remaining
columns present the aggregate capital stock Kt, average labor supply l̄t, aggregate effective
labor Nt, aggregate production Yt, average real money balances m̄t, government transfers
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Figure 6: Average income tax rate
trt, and total income taxes Taxt, and the Gini coefficients of the income distribution. No-
tice that the increase in the marginal and average income tax rates between two successive
periods of the tax schedule adjustment results in an increase of total income taxes of ap-
proximately 2.5% each year. Similarly, transfers to the households also increase in order
to keep the government budget balanced. Surprisingly, aggregate savings, Kt + m̄t, and
average labor supply l̄t even increase with higher marginal tax rates. However, quanti-
tative effects are of relatively small order. As a consequence, the pre-tax wage income
remains almost unchanged during the course of bracket cree’ and is characterized by a Gini
coefficient equal to approximately 0.56. Notice that this value is close to values observed
empirically. Dı́az-Giménez et al. (1997) find a value of 0.51 for households aged 36-50. The
Gini coefficient of the total net income is smaller and amounts to only 0.49 as income is
taxed progressively and transfers are distributed lump-sum. During the course of no ad-
justment, the Gini coefficient of total net income falls by about 0.4%. Given that the Gini
coefficient in the U.S. increased roughly by 2% per decade from the 1970s to 1990s (based
on figures by Kopczuk et al. 2010), the effect can be made responsible for offsetting about
one fifth of the decadal rise in income inequality. In absolute terms, therefore, this effect
approximately corresponds to the effect the decline in union membership had on earnings
inequality in the U.S. as calculated by Freeman (1993). According to figures provided by
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Table 3: “Bracket creep”, aggregate values and distribution for π = 5%
year t after Gini coefficient
tax code Wage Total Net
adjustment Kt l̄t Nt Yt m̄t trt Taxt Income Income
0 2.063 0.2963 0.3604 0.6754 0.1425 0.03532 0.06514 0.561 0.496
1 2.065 0.2992 0.3638 0.6797 0.1419 0.03676 0.06693 0.560 0.494
2 2.066 0.3027 0.3671 0.6838 0.1412 0.03820 0.06871 0.559 0.492
Table 4: “Bracket creep”, aggregate values and distribution for π = 10%
year t after Gini coefficient
tax code Wage Total Net
adjustment Kt l̄t Nt Yt m̄t trt Taxt Income Income
0 2.065 0.2943 0.3583 0.6731 0.0900 0.0348 0.0647 0.561 0.495
1 2.068 0.2972 0.3616 0.8303 0.0898 0.6774 0.0676 0.560 0.492
2 2.069 0.3002 0.3649 0.8353 0.0895 0.6815 0.0705 0.559 0.489
the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey (Annual Social and Economic Sup-
plement) the Gini coefficient of the white, not Hispanic, U.S. population increased from
39.2% in 1972 to 44.9% in 1999. In this case, the mean increase per decade is even lower
equaling 1.9%, and the distributional bias of the bracket creep corresponds to about 21%
of this effect in absolute terms.
In the U.S. postwar history, double-digit inflation rates of 10-13.5% have been observed in
the mid and late 1970s and early 1980s. In this sense, our strategy turns to counterfactual
simulations combining the average adjustment practice of the pre-85 and total period with
the high levels of inflation witnessed in the last half of the 1970s. In order to consider
the effects of a higher inflation rate, we recompute the model for the money growth rate
θ = π = 10%. The results for the high-inflation economy are summarized in Table 4.
Following an increase of inflation from 5% to 10%, agents reduce their stationary real money
balances. The average real money balances m̄t drops from 0.142 to 0.090. Furthermore,
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Table 5: “Bracket creep”, aggregate values and distribution for π = 5%
Four-annual tax adjustments, TB = 4
year t after Gini coefficient
tax code Wage Total Net
adjustment Kt l̄t Nt Yt m̄t trt Taxt Income Income
0 1.983 0.2774 0.3333 0.6334 0.1451 0.03148 0.05909 0.560 0.495
1 1.986 0.2803 0.3370 0.6382 0.1445 0.03292 0.06089 0.560 0.494
2 1.988 0.2834 0.3407 0.6429 0.1436 0.03438 0.06271 0.559 0.492
3 1.989 0.2868 0.3446 0.6477 0.1426 0.03585 0.06453 0.557 0.490
agents are subject to a more severe bracket creep and governmental tax receipts increase
by a higher percentage between period 0, 1, and 2. Again, our finding for an inflation rate
π = 5% is confirmed that aggregate savings and average labor supply increase during the
course of bracket creep. In addition, higher inflation reduces both the average labor supply
and the inequality of the after-tax income distribution in the presence of bracket creep.
The Gini coefficient of total net income two periods after the most recent tax schedule
adjustment drops from 49.2% to 48.9%. In absolute terms, this effect equals nearly one
third of the mean rise in income inequality of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s as measured by
the Gini coefficient (in particular, for the white, not Hispanic, population).
The U.S. government used to adjust its income tax schedule less frequently in the years
prior to 1985 than in recent years. In order to analyze the effects of a less frequent income
tax schedule adjustment and, hence, a longer duration of the bracket creep, we extend the
duration of the bracket creep to TB = 4 years (keeping the inflation rate at π = 5%); see
the corresponding mean frequency line for the pre-85 period in Appendix 7.1. As can be
seen by inspection of Table 4 and Table 5, agents decrease aggregate savings in this case
by approximately 4.0% (compare the dimension of entries in the respective table). The
fall in the average labor supply l̄t is even more pronounced and amounts to approximately
6.3%. Accordingly, the duration of the “bracket creep” seems to be more important for
the individual’s labor supply and savings decision than the yearly increase in the marginal
and average income tax rates. With regard to the progressive bias on income inequality, a
longer period of bracket creep results in an effect which equals one fourth of the absolute
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value of the mean decadal change in the Gini coefficient.
The implied profound role of the frequency with which the income tax schedule is adjusted
for inflation confirms our empirical findings in the time and frequency domain. In line
with our bivariate spectral analytic results, a more frequent inflation adjustment (shorter
periods of “creep”) implies a lower dynamic bias in the inflation-inequality relationship
(Table 1).
6 Conclusion
“Bracket creep” has often been cited in the literature as one of the major distortionary
effects of inflation. However, whether moderate levels of inflation also affect income-
inequality through bracket creep has virtually not been analyzed since the 1970s. Both
our empirical and theoretical analysis suggest a progressive effect. In terms of size, it
amounts to about one fifth to one third of the absolute value of the mean change in the
Gini coefficient for one decade. The quantitative effects depend not only on the level of
inflation but, in particular, also on the indexation system that is in place. In sum, we
find that the duration of the bracket creep, i.e. the time period between two successive
income tax schedule adjustments, is more important for equilibrium values of aggregate
savings and average labor supply than the annual change in the tax rates due to bracket
creep. A shorter duration of bracket creep results in higher equilibrium labor supply and
output. In this sense, our results suggest the change in U.S. tax policy after 1985 and the
inflation-indexation under ERTA to represent a successful change.
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7 Appendix
7.1 U.S. income tax: changes of brackets and rates 1948-2004
The post-war changes of the U.S. income tax schedule are summarized in Table 6 below.
The main source of the entries in this table is the IRS (2003) along with volumes of the
U.S. Major Tax Guide and the ‘Individual Tax Statistics: Complete Report Publications’
of the IRS, where these volumes were available.
In the first column of the table, the second date is the decisive one and gives the year
of implementation of either a change of tax bracket boundaries (TBCt) or of regular in-
come tax rates for fixed boundaries (TRCt) or of, at least, one of the former: TCCt =
max {TBCt;TRCt}. TCCt captures any change in a nominally defined parameter of the
tax code. Index t denotes the specific year of change. The strength of adjustment is classi-
fied ‘substantial’ (‘partial’) in case of at least two (at most one) changing brackets (bracket)
and/or at least two (at most one) adjusted tax rates (rate) for fixed boundaries. In this
context, it is noteworthy that the partial changes for tax years 1968, 1969, and 1970 refer
to the highest bracket’s tax rate which was additionally burdened with a Vietnam War
surcharge equal to 7.5% of tax for 1968, 10% of tax for 1969, and 2.5% of tax for 1970.
This surcharge did not alter any other than the highest bracket’s rate.
For more detail on the major legislative changes enacted and realized during the period
of observation the reader is referred to the outline in Auerbach and Feenberg (2000). The
changes of tax brackets reported in the following Table 6 are based on figures of boundaries
for statutory taxable net income, i.e. income after subtracting deductions but before
subtracting personal exemptions. Income in this definition still is the tax base for regular
income tax, applicable to U.S. citizens and residents. Deductions and provisions unique to
nonresident aliens are not considered. The same holds for the tax rates underlying variable
TRCt. They also exclude the effect of tax liability reducing tax credits and refer to regular
income tax, consisting in normal tax and surtax.15
15in effect, combined into a single rate structure; see IRS (2003), p. 325.
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Table 6. U.S. individual income tax: changes of brackets and rates 1948-2004
Consecutive Adjustment Major legislative Variables
tax years strength change TBCt TRCt TCCt
49 - 50 substantial − 0 1 1
50 - 51 substantial − 0 1 1
51 - 52 substantial − 0 1 1
53 - 54 substantial − 0 1 1
63 - 64 substantial Revenue Act 1 1 1
64 - 65 substantial − 1 1 1
67 - 68 partial − 0 1 1
68 - 69 partial Reform Act 0 1 1
69 - 70 partial − 0 1 1
76 - 77 substantial − 1 0 1
78 - 79 substantial − 1 0 1
80 - 81 substantial Recovery Tax Act (I) 0 1 1
81 - 82 substantial − 1 1 1
82 - 83 substantial − 1 1 1
83 - 84 partial − 1 0 1
84 - 85 substantial Recovery Tax Act (II) 1 0 1
85 - 86 substantial Reform Act 1 0 1
86 - 87 substantial − 1 1 1
87 - 88 substantial − 1 1 1
88 - 89 substantial − 1 0 1
89 - 90 substantial − 1 0 1
90 - 91 substantial OB Reconciliation Act 1 1 1
91 - 92 substantial − 1 0 1
92 - 93 substantial − 1 1 1
93 - 94 substantial − 1 0 1
94 - 95 substantial − 1 0 1
95 - 96 substantial − 1 0 1
96 - 97 substantial − 1 0 1
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Table 6 (continued). U.S.income tax: changes of brackets and rates 1948-2004
Consecutive Adjustment Major legislative Variables
tax years strength change TBCt TRCt TCCt
97 - 98 substantial − 1 0 1
98 - 99 substantial − 1 0 1
99 - 00 substantial − 1 0 1
00 - 01 substantial − 1 1 1
01 - 02 substantial − 1 1 1
02 - 03 substantial − 1 1 1
03 - 04 substantial − 1 0 1
pre-85: (i) sum 7 12 15
(ii) mean frequency (yrs) 5.29 3.08 2.46
post-84: (i) sum 20 7 20
(ii) mean frequency (yrs) 1.00 2.86 1.00
total period: (i) sum 27 19 35
(ii) mean frequency (yrs) 2.11 3.00 1.63
In general, there are four different (historical) sets of rates and brackets depending on
the respective tax paying person(s): First, “income splitters”, i.e. married taxpayers who
“use the joint return filling status” and split their income for tax purposes in an effort to
effectively double the width of their taxable (or net income) size brackets. Figures un-
derlying the chronological categorization of Table 6 above are based on this set. Second,
starting with 1952, a set of rates was introduced for “heads of households”, i.e., for un-
married individuals who paid over half of the cost of maintaining a home for a qualifying
person (e.g., a child or parent), or for certain married individuals who had lived apart from
their spouses for the last six months of the tax year. This filling status was liberalized
in 1970 and provides approximately half the advantages of the income-splitting. Third,
the so-called “surviving spouse”-set of rates and brackets for which both, rates and taxable
income brackets, are designed analogously to the ones of income-splitters. Finally, the
remaining taxpayer-set is given for single persons. Since the late 1960s there has been an
effort of convergence of this set with the one of married couples filling jointly.
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7.2 Interpretation of phase spectra
Figure 7: The phase shift on circular and linear scale
In Figure 7, we assume two stationary time series X and Y . The phase shift between
these series can be visualized either on circular scale (top diagram) or linear scale (bottom
diagram):
In the upper schedule, there are three phase angles for the cyclical components correspond-
ing to the frequencies ω1, ω2, and ω3. At frequency ω1, Y obviously leads X with a phase
shift of about π/4. In this example, the phase shift rises with increasing ω (second circle,
top row). There is a frequency where the phase shift reaches value π. However, this phase
shift cannot be distinguished from φxy (ω) = −π; i.e. there is no difference between the
statement “Series Y leads series X with half a cycle length” and the statement “Series Y
lags series X with half a cycle length.” A discontinuity in the linear representation (bottom
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diagram) between ω1 and ω2 results. A practical solution to overcome this discontinuity
for interpretational ease is given in the text.
A positive (negative) slope in the linear representation of the phase spectrum suggests that
cyclic components Y lead (lag) cyclic components X in a particular frequency band.
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7.3 Bivariate spectral analysis: Gini/inflationa b
(not for publication)

































































































































Continued: Bivariate spectral analysis: Pre-1985 period 1948-1984c

































































































































Continued: Bivariate spectral analysis: Post-1984 period 1985-2004d

































































































































Note: aColumns: Gini coefficient series; Rows: inflation rate; † relative higher sc at |ps| ≤ 1;
b BK: 1951-2001, CF: 1950-2002, logD: 1951-2004
c BK: 1951-1984, CF: 1950-1984, logD: 1951-1984
d BK: 1985-2001, CF: 1985-2002, logD: 1985-2004
7.4 Stationary Equilibrium of the Model in Section 3
(not for publication)
The concept of equilibrium applied in this paper uses a recursive representation of the




jt, z, µ) be the value of the
objective function of the j-year old agent with equity kijt, real money m
i
jt, and idiosyncratic
productivity level z in period t. The distribution of money and capital is denoted by µ(.).
As the tax schedule is adjusted every TB periods, the period t is also an argument of the


































subject to (7), (8) or (9) and k,m ≥ 0. Optimal decision rules of the agent i in period t
at age j are a function of the individual state variables kijt, m
i
jt, and z, the distribution of
money and capital, µ, and the period t. Let ct(k,m, z, j, µ), lt(k,m, z, j, µ), k
′
t(k,m, z, j, µ),
and m′t(k,m, j, µ) denote the optimal consumption, labor supply, next-period capital stock,
and next-period real money balances for a j-year aged individual with productivity z,
capital stock k, and real money balances m, and distribution of capital k and money m
in period t. Furthermore, let µt(k,m, z, j) denote the measure of j-year old agents with
productivity z in period t that hold capital k and real money balances m.
We will consider a stationary equilibrium where the inflation rate is constant in every
period t. Furthermore, government consumption is assumed to be constant, Gt = G, and
pensions pent are assumed to be of equal magnitude every TB periods, respectively. As
a consequence, the factor prices, aggregate capital and labor, and the distribution µt are
also the same every TB periods, respectively.
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A stationary equilibrium for a given government policy {b0,t, b1,t, b2,t, Gt, pent} and central
bank policy θt = θ is a collection of value functions V
i
jt(k,m, z, µ), individual policy rules
ct(k,m, z, j, µ), lt(k,m, z, j, µ), k
′
t(k,m, z, j, µ), m
′
t(k,m, z, j, µ), relative prices of labor and
capital {wt, rt}, and a law of motion for the distribution µt+1 = g(µt) such that:
1. Money grows at the exogenous rate θ and the seignorage (20) is transferred lump-sum
to the government.
2. The inflation rate πt is constant and equal to the money growth rate θ.
3. The government adjusts the tax schedule in the years {0, TB, 2TB, . . .}. In the years
t ∈ {p + TB, p + 2TB, p + 3TB, . . .}, p = 0, . . . , TB − 1, government consumption
Gt and individual pensions pent are the same, respectively so that all exogenous
variables in the economy are the same every TB periods.
4. The government budget (17) is balanced.
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m µt(k,m, z, j)dz dm dk, (29)
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where a′t(.) ≡ k′t(.)+m′t(.) are the optimal next-period assets and yt(k,m, z, j) denotes
the real income of a j-year old agent with productivity z, capital k, and money m in
period t. Furthermore, trt = Trt.
6. Relative prices {wt, rt} solve the firm’s optimization problem by satisfying (15) and
(16).
7. Given the government policy {b0,t, b1,t, b2,t, Gt, pent} and the distribution µt, the in-




t+1(.), and lt(.) solve the consumer’s dynamic
program (22).
8. The goods market clears in every period t:
Kαt N
1−α
t = Ct + δKt +Kt+1 −Kt. (30)
9. The dynamics of the distribution µt+1 = g(µt) are consistent with individual behavior:
µt+1(k






1k′=k′t(k,m,z,j,µ) · 1m′=m′t(k,m,z,j,µ) · Pr(z
′|z) · µt(k,m, z, j) dz dm dk,
where 1k′=k′t(.) is an indicator function that takes the value one if k
′ = k′t(.) and
zero otherwise. 1m′=m′t(.) is defined in an analogous way. Furthermore, the new-born
generation has zero wealth, k = 0 and m = 0.16 Notice further that, in particular,
µt = µt+TB in a stationary equilibrium.
7.5 Computation (not for publication)
The model of section 3 cannot be solved analytically, but only numerically. The solution
algorithm is described by the following steps:
1. Parameterize the model. Let TB denote the number of years between two adjust-
ments of the nominal income tax schedule.
16For computational purpose, agents of the first-year generation are endowed with small money balances
so that the utility function does not take the value of infinity.
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2. Make initial guesses of the law of motion for the aggregate capital stock
{K0, K1, K2, . . . , KTB−1}, aggregate effective labor {N0, N1, N2, . . . , NTB−1}, aggre-
gate real money {M/P0,M/P1,M/P2, . . . ,M/PTB−1} and aggregate (=invidual) trans-
fers {tr0, tr1, . . . , trTB−1}.
3. Compute the values of wt and rt for t = 0, 1, . . . , TB − 1 that solve the firm’s Euler
equations. Compute the pension pent so that the replacement rate of pensions with
regard to net average labor income is equal to the empirical value.
4. Compute the household’s decision functions by solving the Euler equations.
5. Compute the distribution µt of the individual state variable {k,m, z, j} by forward
induction over age j = 1, . . . , T + TR for t = 0, 1, . . . , TB − 1.
6. Compute the aggregate capital stock {K0, K1, . . . , KTB−1}, aggregate effective labor
{N0, N1, N2, . . . , NTB−1}, aggregate real money {M/P0,M/P1,M/P2, . . . ,M/PTB−1}
and aggregate transfers {tr0, tr1, . . . , trTB−1}. Update {K0, K1, . . . , KTB−1},
{N0, N1, N2, . . . , NTB−1}, {M/P0,M/P1,M/P2, . . . ,M/PTB−1} and {tr0, tr1, . . . , trTB−1}
and return to step 2 until convergence.
We discretize the state space (k,m, z) using an equispaced grid over the capital stock k, the
money balances m, and the individual productivity z. The upper grid points kmax = 20.0
and mmax = 0.4 are found to be non-binding. For the productivity z, the (five-point)
grid ranges from −2σy1 to 2σy1 . The probability of having productivity shock z1 in the
first period of life is computed by integrating the area under the normal distribution.
The transition probabilities are computed using the method of Tauchen (1986). As a
consequence, the efficiency index e(z, j) follows a finite Markov chain.
In step 4, a finite-time dynamic programming problem is to be solved. We use piecewise
linear functions in order to approximate the policy functions ct(k,m, z, j), k
′
t(k,m, z, j),
m′t(k,m, z, j), and lt(k,m, z, j) between grid points. In particular, we solve the Euler
functions (10)-(13) for given sequence of the aggregate capital stock Kt, aggregate effective
employment Nt, and transfers trt. The methods for the computation of the policy functions
and the aggregate variables are described in detail in Heer and Maußner (2009).
As the household is born without any assets, his first-period wealth and his real money
balances are zero. As a consequence, the value function would take the value −∞ as
37
m1t = 0. For computational purposes, therefore, we slightly change the utility function
and introduce a small constant ψ into (6), ũ = u(c,m+ ψ, 1− l).
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